Prague - The new Czech government vows to be different from its predecessors, but like them it faces the old dilemma of how to use the profit generated by the state-controlled giant CEZ energy utility, Martin Zverina writes in Lidove noviny (LN) today.
In the past, many politicians came up with numerous fabulous promises and plans how to use CEZ´s profit. Finally the state always spent the money. It is not known on what, but this is actually not important, Zverina writes.
Should CEZ be "milked" for the benefit of voters, or should the state - as a responsible manager - keep a part of CEZ´s profit as a reserve, for the extension of the Temelin nuclear power plant, for example? Zverina asks.
A correct answer to this question does not exist. A responsible manager would have never backed CEZ´s expansion to Albania. On the other hand, regular dissolving of CEZ´s profits in the state budget is not a better solution, Zverina writes.
Elsewhere in Lidove noviny (LN), Petr Kambersky describes the post-1989 interior minister Richard Sacher, who died this week, as a personality full of contradictions.
Sacher officially dissolved the infamous communist secret police StB and signed an agreement with KGB head Vladimir Kruychkov in Moscow, Kambersky says.
Sacher was immensely trusted by Vaclav Havel, the then powerful president. Any time Havel needed to screen someone´s past, Sacher provided the relevant StB file for him to study, Kambersky says.
This would be unthinkable now, and it illustrates the close relations between Havel and Sacher, he continues.
However, within his non-standard methods, Sacher had the StB files concerning key persons "put aside," which later caused problems. As a result, it is still not known for sure whether Sacher himself had been an StB agent before 1989, Kambersky writes.
Sacher used to say that a battle had been fought for the StB archive from the beginning. This battle still continues now, 25 years after the fall of communism, Kambersky adds.
In the daily Pravo, Jan Keller challenges the work of media in modern information society, describing it as undesirably stereotypical.
When a war conflict, an uprising or a revolution breaks out in a world region, hundreds of "specialist" reporters mushroom on the media scene though a crushing majority of them never showed interest in the afflicted region before, Keller writes.
The reporters actually need not know anything about it because the stream of information is determined beforehand irrespective of whether Iraq, Egypt, Georgia, Libya, Syria or Ukraine are involved, he says.
"From the first day of the conflict, we always exactly know with whom we side and whom we fiercely oppose. We always oppose the dictators with whom our political leaders had themselves photographed recently, to whom they sold weapons and with whom they signed politically friendly agreements," Keller writes.
The wave of negative information about the unseated dictators leaves little space for the media to focus on their successors. They are only beforehand labelled true democrats, Keller says.
"We never learn what the impact of their democratisation steps will be...The important thing is that the countries in question resumed their supplies of raw materials to us, that they buy our weapons again and provide space for us to establish a peace military base," Keller writes.